There has been considerable controversy over Augustine's Christology throughout this century, concerning the attribution of sources, and whether he ought to be characterized as Antiochene or Alexandrian in his general approach -that is, whether he prefers a dynamic grace-centred model of the Christological union, such as that of Theodore and Nestorius, or whether he envisages a more substantial root of the union such as that argued by the language of hypostatic union of Cyril and Chalcedon. This article will review some aspects of that issue and attempt to elaborate a perspective from which to approach his Christology. It is not intended here to expose the whole complex range of Augustine's doctrine of Christ; it will be enough to point out significant areas of its development. Several excellent studies have already treated this dimension,' although Augustine's far-ranging complexity on this subject, as on most, makes the issue a wonderful research ground for further work. Even the casual reader of Augustine on this subject realizes just how much his emphasis on the redemptive humility of Christ provided the spur and context of Barth's monumental Christology. Moreover, Augustine's special emphasis on an ecclesiological Christology (the lotus Christus approach in which he joins in a symbiosis his thoughts on the person of Christ and the destiny of the saints of Christ who are his body) makes him stand apart in the lists of the patristic giants, a brilliant interpreter of the later Pauline Christology.
Christological reflection. The discussion has particular relevance for the modern Chrisological debate which has reopened many of the old arguments.
THE CONTROVERSY OVER AUGUSTINE'S CHRISTOLOGY
In the late nineteenth century investigation into Augustinian Christology was revitalized by Augustus Dorner and Adolf Harnack.' Both scholars brought to the forefront Augustine's frequent use of phrases in his writings which spoke of the presence of God in Christ by grace, and of 'the man assumed by the deity', terms preferred by the Antiochene school of theologians of the fifth century, rather than the Alexandrian tradition reflected at Ephesus in 431 and triumphant at Constantinople I1 in 553. Both scholars observed that it was characteristic of Augustine to regard the act of assumptio which constituted the incarnation of the Word as a Trinitarian actus rather than a movement proper to the Logos alone3 -a perspective which had frequently been presumed by the earlier tradition. As a result, Dorner and Harnack argued, the uniqueness of Jesus for Augustine could no longer be posited along the lines of a profound and unrepeatable localization of the Word in him, and if this uniqueness were to be preserved it had to be reargued on the basis of a singular receptivity in Christ to the presence of God. To summarize very crudely: if this were so, Augustine would be rejecting concrete terms for the Christological union and preferring the dynamic category of relationship (a thematic insight so prevalent in his De Trinitare). In short he would be in the camp of Eustathius of Antioch, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Nestorius of Constantinople, who described the union of the divine and human in Christ as a correlation on the basis of grace ( o u v a c p e i a K a r ' e b G o K i a v ) and who stressed the separateness of those factors that stood in relationship by their formula, 'the man assumed by God'. This, not unexpectedly, came as quite a shock to the world of Catholic scholarship of the period, which had canonized Augustine as the supreme doctor of the Catholic tradition and found it inconceivable that on such an important matter he could ever be found in the same bath-tub as Nestorius.
The surprise on this front was indicative of two facts: firstly, that Augustine's Christology had been, in the main, passed over on the presumption that he simply agreed with Leo, which is only partly true; and secondly, that the neoscholastic method of Catholic theology prevalent at that period had over-rigidly classified areas of theological enquiry in its methodological approach, leaving it particularly ill-prepared to attain a clear perspective.
The Augustine's Christology seems to evolve in three clear stages. It was an intellectual evolution that did not need to be forged in the exigencies of any apologetic as was the case with his later doctrine of grace and predestination. This is surely a factor which makes the development of his Christology all the more interesting for us and sets it as a more accurate indicator of the state of Western tradition at that period.
Augustine knew of Photinianism, an Arian form of Christological adoptionism, through Ambrose who had been an imperial administrator in Sirmium when Photinus himself was in residence in the city after the emperor Julian's recall of'heterodox exiles. In the Confessions Augustine was even able to identify his youthful self retrospectively as a crypto-Photinian;12 but that position was certainly not his from the time of his return to Africa from Milan, nor was it a position that had any current representation in the African Church. Both Augustine and his close friend and colleague Alypius were from the outset convinced of the basic and simple reality of the full range of Jesus's human life, and neither had any inclination to positions such'as Apollinarism which elaborated a limited Christological union o n the basis of a diminished sense of the real manhood of Jesus. I3 Augustine had first-hand experience of Arianism later in his ministry in the form of the German auxiliaries who garrisoned Hippo Regius under Boniface, Count of Africa, but his apologetic writings in this context all reflect the reality that in the fifth century, up to the time of the Vandal invasions,
Arianism was a spent force in the African Church -a religion of foreign baibarians. Augustine defends the Nicene orthodoxy with the sense of assurance that this is a wholly established position. In his treatment he follows Hilary, Marius Victorinus and Ambrose, all of whose texts he has read, and he advances on them to the extent that he labours to remove the last trace of 'subordinationism' in his Trinitarian thought, a movement that perhaps had a not wholly beneficial result on subsequent theological development.
The Donatist crisis in which Augustine was embroiled did not turn around Christology at all. The only arguable effect it can be posited as having on his doctrine was perhaps to deepen the ecclesial base of his Christology. He learned from Tyconius, the great Donatist lay theologian, his rules of exegesis, the first of which (De Domino el corpore eius) maintained that scripture habitually makes no distinction between Christ and his body, the Church, as both are bound together as one mystery. This aspect of Augustine's thought has been typified under the title, 'tofus Chrisfus'Christology. In other words, he is greatly influenced by the Pauline'schema of Christ as head over many members.I4 There is no clear line in Augustine's Christology between Christ understood as an individual historical locus and Christ as a mystical summatio -it is an aspect of Augustinian thought which Barth will later reinvent. This approach givcs Augustine's whole Christology a breadth and coherence that resists any reductionist approach, sadly so common in patristic commentators, that seeks to break it down into decontextualized formulae. Augustine never had to produce any new technical definitions, and this is why his Christology is expansive and resists neat classification.
The last great controversy of Augustine's life was Pelagianism. Again
Christology as such was not the central bone of contention here, but in so far as his thoughts on the nature of grace and election were greatly sharpened by the dispute with Caelestius, Pelagius '6 It is in these commentaries on the Psalms that the idea of the centrality of the soul of Christ first appears in Augustine's work. H e uses the notion of the closeness of the body-soul relationship as a favourite analogy for the terms o f the Christological union. In the case of the composition o f a man, spirit is joined with flesh -two very disparate elements indeed, yet they make up an intimate whole. In the case of Christ, however, a n easier and deeper In the sermons of this period. In Letter 187 Augustine elaborates a doctrine o f degrees of presence. God is present fofus ubique: entirely and everywhere, without discrimination. H e is present t o all things in existence, giving form, but dwells in, or inhabits, only beings which have understanding and volition. These he indwells only to the extent that they are 'with him', that is, orientated towards him with love and attention." Augustine maintains here that God dwells only in those who are influenced by his grace,25 a n d they take hold of him (cupere) t o a greater or lesser degree according t o their readiness. Using Colossians 2:9 he describes how 'in Christ the fullness of the godhead dwells bodily'. This he argues cannot be taken t o mean 'materially' but rather that Christ is the head and sum o f what is represented in the saints, who are his body. Although the Christological union is unique, it is effected by grace just a s much as the indwelling of God in other men -only more so, for here there is a ' (In Letter 187) he argues that God is present to Christ not substantially nor by operation, but by love and grace, and that this gracious presence differs from the divine presence to the just in general in its fullness and because it brings about a personal union between the Word and the man in Christ. 27 Dewart's thesis may be characterized, therefore, as having two parts (beyond the obvious and undisputed point that here in Letter 187is a Christology based on the notions of grace and love). The first is a radical distinction she wishes to draw between 'substantial presence' and 'grace-presence' . The second is that this view is dependent quite specifically on Augustine's reading of Theodore's treatise De Incurnutione before he composed his Letrer 187. I would suggest that both inferences are mistaken.
In the first place all the protagonists in the East knew that the Christological union could never be posited on the basis of the term ousia (substance or essence). It was an old chestnut to accuse one's enemies of having fallen into this folly, but no one seriously argued it either in the late fourth century or the fifth. The battle turned around the legitimate employment of other terms to posit union, such as physis and hypostusis -terms signifying concretization and quality but not essence. As Jerome found out the hard way, trying to make sense for the West of the new use of hypostusis in the Trinitarian solutions of the late fourth century, a new and hard line had emerged in the East between the legitimate application of ousia and other qualitatives such as hypostusis and physis. This was not immediately apparent to the Western theologians who had traditionally bothered to make little distinction between substuntia and nuturu, and who had the alarming experience of initially misreading the Eastern theology of three hypostuses in God as being synonymous with three nuturae, hence tritheistic. Nonetheless, in the central matter in hand, the Latin tradition after Tertullian was no less certain than the East that neither substuntia nor naturu could ever, in any circumstances, be used to depict the Christological union. The unitive term was unquestionably, and strictly, persona, So i f we are to make any sense of a thesis that supposes an Augustinian rejection of 'substantial unity' it is clear that we need to clarify the terms of the argument much more precisely. What seems to be the issue, in other words, is whether Augustine elects an ontologically based union or a dynamic, gracecentred model -a moral union. The simple fact of the matter is that he prefers both approaches, and does not see them as mutually opposing, an insight that was sadly missed at Ephesus in 431 and 449. The fact that he does not see the categories of 'substantial' and 'graceful' as mutually opposing descriptors in the Christology debate can be confirmed by the way in which four years after his Letter I87 he writes a synopsis of Christology in the Enchiridion which returns ,wholesale to the terms of the traditional Latin settlement.
Dewart argues that Augustine deliberately parts company with Gregory Nazianzen's Letter to Cledoniu?* over this matter:
In this case (Augustinel rejected the very mode of union that Gregory had opted for, substantial (kat'ousian), and adopted the one he had rejected, by grace (kara charin) (Ep. It is clear that by this unique assumption of the man he is made one person with the Word. For it has never been, nor is it, nor will it ever be, possible to say of any of the saints: And the Word was made flesh. None of the saints by any excellence of grace of any kind ever received the name of Only Begotten. Augustine, then, is using the images of grace and inhabitation but not exclusively so in the way Dewart seems to suggest. His point is not to reject an ontologically founded Christological unity -indeed this is just what is implied by the fifth-century philosophical conception of in una per~ona;~' rather his treatment at this point in the Letter is preoccupied with demonstrating the exegetical nicety that 'the fullness of the deity dwelling bodily' (of Colossians 2:9) does not imply that God's presence is a material entity.32
When Augustine speaks of a union in unu persona he does not mean that the psychological human subject Jesus of Nazareth has been absorbed in or replaced by the subject of the Word of God. He does not use 'person' in this psychological sense. In modern thought the term 'person' refers to an individual rational identity. For Augustine it meant straightforwardly a principle or a function of the unity of separate elements. In its functional usage Augustine speaks of Jesus 'in his person as a priest';33 in its unitive usage it was applied in the long-standing debate in ancient philosophy over the nature of 'composites'. For example, in the composite of human nature, according to fifth-century psychology, personal unity joins together a soul and flesh. To be a human person is to have this kind of psychosomatic unity. In the case of Christ, Augustine is arguing that he has this kind of unity in so far as he is truly a man, but that he also has a higher principle of unity in his being, for the composite of soul and body of Christ is further united or more profoundly integrated with the Word. There is, then, a threefold composite of Word, soul and body. The person of Christ means the union of divine and human natures. Augustine puts it simply: 'Just as any man unites in one person a rational soul and body, so Christ unites in one person the Logos and a man'. 34 Dewart proceeds in the second part of her thesis to tie the connecting lines between Augustine and the Antiochenes even more tightly by postulating a direct literary dependence of Letter 187 on Theodore's De Zncarnatione. To support this she cites seven instances of p a r a l l e l i~m .~~ In none of them can I find any synonymity of language, only the commonality of the theme of God's presence in the saints. At several instances of supposed parallel Augustine is clearly elaborating his argument from the basis of biblical allusions which are not present in Theodore. If there had been a literary dependence, biblical paradigms might well have been omitted but hardly added in the way they appear in Augustine's text -closely woven into the fabric of his argument. Moreover it is very questionable indeed whether Augustine was able to read Greek fluently by 416, and there is no evidence to suggest that Theodore's work was circulating in Africa in Latin translation by that date. Dewart's two supportive arguments in this respect are extremely weak. 36 The first, that 'Theodore was highly esteemed in the East and as likely as any to be translated', is not worthy of consideration; and the second, that 'We also know that he (Theodore) was popular at a later date in North Africa', is beside the point. This refers to Facundus of Hermiana who knew a Latin version of Theodore in AD 548. But the Three Chapters controversy explains the dissemination of his works in the West at that period.
I I I r n~l . Antiochene thesis ar all. The doctrine of the degrees of presence is a concern that exercised Plotinus and Porphyry generally to the point of being a topos of the Neoplatonic school. Marius Victorinus' own Christology pays great attention to the que~tion,~' and Hadot's critical study has shown that the concept of the incorporeal within the sensible is a distinctive mark of all Victorinus' thought. We are led to conclude, therefore, that it is from the writings of Porphyry mediated to him through the Christian circle of Victorinus, Simplicianus the priest, and Ambrose, that Augustine gained the seed of his ideas that was later to blossom in Letter 187, On the Presence of God.
CONCLUSION
This article began with a controversy over how 'orthodox' or how traditional Augustine was in his Christology. The key conclusion that emerges is that it is an anachronistic and ultimately pointless exercise to attempt to assess Augustine's Christology either by the standard of Ephesus or Chalcedon. His thought is deeply rooted in traditional Latin forms. But it is just as true to say that he advances on those forms in a quite innovative way: firstly by approaching the incarnation as a complete Trinitarian actus, secondly by considerably developing the psychological model of the composite unity of Christ, and finally by applying his insights into the divine initiative of grace to the spiritual life of Christ.
In short, the so-called Antiochenism of Augustine is not a Syrian influence at all but a long-standing aspect of traditional Latin Christology. The story of how this came back, fully formed, into the East in the shape of Leo's Tome is well known. The Tome itself owed much to A~g u s t i n e .~' It is significant that when this very independent Latin Christological tradition appeared on the agenda at Ephesus in 449 it so greatly disconcerted Dioscorus of Alexandria that he too, wrongly, thought that an Antiochene inspiration must have been at work. 
